Calculating relevant entropic quantities of probability distributions and quantum states is a fundamental task in information processing. The decision problem version of estimating the Shannon entropy is the Entropy Difference problem (ED): given descriptions of two circuits, determine which circuit produces more entropy in its output when acting on a uniformly random input. The analogous problem with quantum circuits (QED) is to determine which circuit produces the state with greater von Neumann entropy, when acting on a fixed input state and after tracing out part of the output. Based on plausible complexity-theoretic assumptions, both of these problems are believed to be intractable for polynomial-time quantum computation.
Introduction
The entropy of a probability distribution or a quantum state is a useful measure for characterising information content with numerous applications in information theory. Shannon and von Neumann entropies, both appear in data compression [Sch95] and asymptotic cryptography [DW05] , and in the case of the von Neumann entropy, entanglement theory [BBPS96] . Furthermore, this link to entanglement theory has led to the use of the von Neumann entropy in condensed matter theory [ECP10] and quantum gravity research [RT06] .
Given its importance in physics and information theory, it is natural to ask how difficult it is to estimate the entropy of a process. A natural way to formalise this question is in terms of sample complexity: this looks at how many samples from an unknown probability distribution, or how many copies of an unknown quantum state, are needed to estimate its entropy. Previous work has considered various algorithms, both quantum and classical, for computing the entropy of a probability distribution [DKRB02, WY16, JVHW17, VV11], as well as entropies of quantum states [HGKM10, AISW19, SH19] . More recently, it has been shown that for multiple entropy measures, computing the relevant entropy is as hard as full state tomography [AISW19, SH19, OW15] . In other words, the sample complexity would scale with the support of the probability distribution, or the dimension of the Hilbert space for the quantum state, respectively. To provide some intuition for why entropy estimation is difficult, in Appendix A, we use the computational complexity tools of advice to give a simple proof that no algorithm exists for efficiently estimating the entropy of an a priori unknown quantum state. In particular, we show that if the entropy of a (mixed) quantum state could be estimated within additive error in time that scales polynomially in the number of qubits of the state and in log(1/ ), then such an algorithm could be leveraged to solve any problem. To be more precise, it would imply that polynomial-time quantum computation with quantum advice, could decide all languages, which is known to be false.
Rather than considering sample complexity, an operational way of capturing the complexity of entropy estimation is to start with descriptions of two random processes and ask which process produces more entropy in its output. The natural decision problem for this task was defined by Goldreich and Vadhan [GV99] and is known as the entropy difference (ED) problem: given two classical circuits C 1 and C 2 , let C 1 (x) and C 2 (x) define the output distributions of the two circuits when acting on an n-bit string, x, drawn from the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n ; the problem is to decide whether C 1 (x) has higher entropy than C 2 (x) or vice versa (promised that one of these is the case and promised that the entropy difference is at least 1/poly(n)).
What can one say about the computational hardness of this problem? In [GV99] it was shown that the problem is complete for the class SZK. This class, known as statistical zero-knowledge, contains all decision problems for which a computationally unbounded prover can convince a polynomial-time verifier that there exists a solution, when one exists (and fail to do so when a solution does not exist) without revealing anything about the solution to the verifier 1 . Due to oracle separation results [Aar02] and from the fact that certain cryptographic tasks (such as finding collisions for a cryptographic hash function) are contained in SZK, it is believed that SZK contains problems that are intractable even for polynomial-time quantum algorithms. Thus, the fact that ED is complete for SZK tells us that we should expect a similar intractability for the problem of distinguishing the entropies of general classical circuits.
Transitioning to the quantum setting, Ben-Aroya, Schwartz and Ta-Shma defined the analogue of ED known as the quantum entropy difference (QED) problem [BASTS10] . In this case, the input circuits C 1 and C 2 are polynomial-size quantum circuits acting on a fixed input state (say the state |00...0 ), and a fraction of the output qubits are traced out. The remaining qubits will generally be mixed quantum states. As in the classical case, the question is which of the two mixed states (the one produced by C 1 or the one produced by C 2 ) has higher entropy, subject to the same promise as for ED (that there is a 1/poly(n) gap in the entropy difference). Ben-Aroya et al showed that QED is complete for the class QSZK, the quantum counterpart of SZK of problems admitting a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof protocol [BASTS10] . Assuming QSZK strictly contains SZK, this would mean that QED is strictly harder than ED.
For both ED and QED the circuits under consideration were assumed to be polynomial in the size of their inputs. A natural follow-up question is: does the hardness of these problems change if we reduce the depth of the circuits? Specifically, what happens if the circuits have depth that is logarithmic or even constant in the size of the input? Focusing specifically on the quantum case, there are number of reasons why one would be interested in answering these questions. From a complexity-theory perspective, it lets us compare and contrast QSZK to other classes in the interactive proofs model, such as QMA or QIP. Both of these classes have natural complete problems with the inputs being circuits and in both cases the problems remain complete if the circuits are made to have logarithmic depth [Ros08, Ji17] . Furthermore, from a more practical perspective, given that current and near-term quantum computing devices are subject to noise and imperfections, it is expected that the states produced in these experiments will be the result of circuits of low depth. Estimating the entropy of these states would help in computing other quantities of interest such as the amount of entanglement [BBPS96] or the Gibbs free energy [GHR + 16]. It is therefore important to know whether entropy estimation can be performed efficiently for states produced by shallow circuits.
Lastly, we are motivated to answer these questions by recent connections between quantum gravity research and quantum information theory, in the form of the AdS/CFT correspondence [Mal99] . Briefly, AdS/CFT is a correspondence between a quantum gravity theory in a hyperbolic bulk space-time known as Anti-de Sitter (AdS) space and a conformal field theory (CFT) on the boundary of that space-time. The general idea is to compute physical quantities of interest in the bulk quantum gravity theory by mapping them to the boundary field theory. A surprising result to come out of this program is a correspondence between bulk geometry and boundary entanglement known as the Ryu-Takayanagi formula [RT06] . It states that, to leading order, the area of a bulk surface is equal to the entropy of the reduced state on the part of the boundary that encloses that surface. Moreover, for certain families of boundary field theories, it is conjectured that the underlying states can be approximated by logarithmic depth tensor networks known as MERA (multi-scale entanglement renormalization ansatz ) [Swi12] . Thus, characterising the complexity of entropy difference for shallow circuits could yield insight into the complexity of distinguishing different bulk geometries in quantum gravity.
Motivated by all of these various aspects of entropy from shallow circuits, we thus initiate a study of entropy distinguishability for shallow circuits and discuss the potential implications of our results in physics. We show that both the classical and quantum versions of entropy difference are hard assuming that the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem has no efficient algorithm, even for a quantum computer. Since LWE serves as a basis for various schemes of post-quantum cryptography, our result implies that entropy estimation for shallow circuits is intractable unless these cryptographic schemes are unsecure. Remarkably, this result also holds for constant-depth quantum and classical circuits. In contrast, we also show that both versions of entropy distinguishability for shallow classical and quantum circuits are unlikely to be SZK-complete and QSZK-complete respectively. Therefore, the entropy difference problem for both classical and quantum shallow circuits occupies an interesting intermediate complexity. Finally, we consider a version of von Neumann entropy difference where Hamiltonians are given as input, not circuits, and show that this problem is at least as hard as the circuit-based version. This last result allows to relate these computational complexity results to physical systems.
Main results
We start by defining ED δ (QED δ ) as the (quantum) entropy difference problem where the circuits under consideration have depth δ(n), for some monotonically increasing function δ : N → N. We will denote ED polylog (QED polylog ) and ED O(1) (QED O(1) ) to be the collection of all problems ED δ (QED δ ), with δ(n) in O(polylog(n)) and O(1), respectively. Our first result gives an indication that these problems are unlikely to be as hard as their poly-size counterparts. To show this, we will consider SZK δ (QSZK δ ) to be the set of problems that reduce to ED δ (QED δ ) under polynomialtime reductions 2 . For δ(n) = polylog(n), we denote these classes as SZK polylog and QSZK polylog respectively, and prove the following: In particular, this means that SZK O log = SZK O and QSZK O log = QSZK O . The oracle we use is the same as the one from the recent work of Chia, Chung and Lai [CCL19] , showing the separation BPP QNC O = BQP O , where QNC denotes the set of problems that can be solved by quantum circuits of polylogarithmic depth. We conjecture that the oracle of Coudron and Menda [CM19] , showing the same separation, could also be used.
Our second result concerns a direct approach at trying to show that QSZK log = QSZK and why we believe this is unlikely. To explain this approach, let us first discuss the class QIP, of problems that can be decided using an interactive proof system having a quantum verifier. A problem that is complete for this class is the quantum circuit distinguishability problem (QCD), in which one is given as input two quantum circuits and asked to determine whether, when restricting to a subset of input and output qubits, the corresponding channels are close or far in diamond distance. It was shown by Rosgen that this problem remains QIP-complete even when the circuits under consideration are log-depth [Ros08] . This is achieved by constructing log-depth circuits that check a "history state" of the original circuits, which uses a different construction to the Feynman-Kitaev history state [KSV02] . One can also show that any QIP protocol can be made to have a log-depth verifier, using the same history state construction. In analogy to Rosgen's result, we can now suppose that any QSZK protocol can be made into a QSZK log protocol by having the prover send history states of the computations that the verifier in the QSZK protocol would perform. It is clear from the QIP result that making the verifier have logarithmic depth in a QSZK protocol does not reduce the set of problems that can be decided by such a protocol. The question is whether in addition to having a log-depth verifier, the transcript of such a protocol 3 can be produced by a log-depth circuit. We show that if this is possible, then since BQP ⊆ QSZK it would be possible to simulate any BQP computation by "checking" this history state on a log-depth quantum computer. This result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 2. If there exists a polynomial-time reduction from a QSZK protocol with a log-depth verifier to a QSZK log protocol which preserves the transcript of the QSZK protocol, then BQP = BPP QNC 1 .
Based on these results, we conjecture that estimating the output entropy of circuits having (poly)logarithmic or constant depth should be easier than for circuits of larger depth. Despite this fact, our next result shows that even for these shallow circuits, entropy difference is still intractable for polynomial-time classical and quantum algorithms, assuming the quantum intractability of the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem:
LWE, a problem defined by Regev in [Reg09] , serves as the basis for recently proposed cryptographic protocols that are believed to be post-quantum secure. In other words, it is conjectured that no polynomial-time classical or quantum algorithm is able to solve this problem. Recent results have leveraged the versatility of this problem to achieve tasks such as verifiable delegation of quantum computation [Mah18, GV19] , certifiable randomness generation [BCM + 18], and selftesting of a single quantum device [MV20] . In all of these works, the protocols were based on the use of Extended Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions (ETCF), introduced in [Mah18] . An ETCF family consists of a pair of one-way functions, (f, g), that are hard to invert assuming the hardness of LWE. Importantly, f is a 1-to-1 one-way function, whereas g is a 2-to-1 one-way function. An essential property of these functions is that it should be hard (based on LWE) to determine which is the 1-to-1 function and which is the 2-to-1 function, given descriptions of the functions. This property is known as injective invariance. Consider what happens if we evaluate each of these functions on a string x drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1} n . Given that f is a 1-to-1 function, the distribution f (x) is still the uniform distribution over n-bit strings and will therefore have maximum entropy, S(f ) = n. On the other hand, since g is a 2-to-1, g(x) will be the uniform distribution on half of the strings in {0, 1} n , thus having entropy S(g) = n − 1. This means that given descriptions of f and g, if one can distinguish the entropy of their outputs, one can also solve LWE, which effectively shows that LWE ≤ P ED.
While the above argument shows a reduction from LWE to ED, to obtain the result of Theorem 3 one would need an ETCF pair of functions that can be evaluated in constant depth. Such a construction is not known to exist and so we adopt a different approach towards proving the result. We start by showing that the ETCF functions defined in [Mah18] can be performed using log-depth circuits, thus showing LWE ≤ P ED log . This follows from the fact that the specific ETCF functions we use involve only matrix and vector multiplications, which can be parallelized and performed in logarithmic depth 4 . To then go to constant-depth circuits, we use the result of Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz of compiling log-depth one-way functions to constant-depth [AIK06] . The main idea is that, for a given function f , that can be evaluated in log-depth, as well as an input string x, it is possible to produce a randomized encoding of f (x) using a circuit of constant depth. A randomized encoding is an encoded version of f (x) from which f (x) can be efficiently (and uniquely) reconstructed. The main difficulty of the proof is to show that the constant-depth randomized encoders for f and g remain indistinguishable, based on LWE. This then implies the desired result, LWE ≤ P ED O(1) . Since QED O(1) is simply the quantum generalization of ED O(1) , the reduction ED O(1) ≤ P QED O(1) is immediate.
Having obtained this characterisation for the hardness of entropy difference with shallow circuits, we now wish to investigate the potential application of these results to physics. To make this link, we first define a Hamiltonian version of the quantum entropy difference problem, which we denote HQED. Informally, instead of being given as input two quantum circuits and being asked to determine which produces a state of higher entropy, our input will consist of the descriptions of two local Hamiltonians H 1 and H 2 . Upon tracing out a certain number of qubits from the ground states of these Hamiltonians, the problem is to decide which of the two reduced states has higher entropy 5 . Unsurprisingly, it can be shown that this problem is at least at hard as the circuit version:
Theorem 4. QED ≤ P HQED.
The proof makes use of the Feynman-Kitaev history state construction to encode the history state of a quantum circuit in the ground state of a Hamiltonian [KSV02] . Directly using the history states of the circuits, C 1 and C 2 , from an instance of QED would not necessarily yield the desired result since those states have small overlap with the output state of C 1 and C 2 . To get around this issue, we make use of the padding construction from [NVY18] , and pad the circuits C 1 and C 2 with polynomially-many identity gates. It can then be shown that the resulting history states for these new circuits will have overlap 1 − 1/poly(n) with the output states of C 1 and C 2 . Correspondingly, up to inverse polynomial factors, the entropy difference between these states and the original ones is preserved.
If we now denote as HQED log and HQED O(1) the analogous problems in which the ground states can be approximated by circuits of logarithmic and constant depth, respectively, it follows from the previous results that QED log ≤ P HQED log and QED O(1) ≤ P HQED O(1) , and therefore that LWE ≤ P HQED O(1) ≤ P HQED log .
Discussion and open questions
In Theorem 1, as mentioned, the oracle used to separate SZK polylog and SZK (QSZK polylog and QSZK) is taken from the work of Chia et al [CCL19] . Interestingly, Chia et al, along with Coudron and Menda [CM19] , speculate that their oracles could be instantiated based on a cryptographic assumption, such as the hardness of LWE. We further conjecture that for our specific case this should also be true. This would have the intriguing implication that the intractability of LWE implies ED (QED) is "strictly harder" than ED log (QED log ), while at the same time, from Theorem 3, the intractability of LWE also implies ED O(1) (QED O(1) ) is hard for polynomial-time quantum algorithms.
A natural open problem raised by our work is to characterise more precisely the complexity classes induced by the shallow-depth versions of entropy difference (SZK log , SZK const , QSZK log , QSZK const ). We show that these correspond to zero-knowledge protocols in which the verifier and simulator are bounded-depth circuits, but can one give other characterisations of these classes? We have also seen that these classes appear to be strictly contained in their counterparts with general polynomial-depth circuits. Thus, if estimating the entropy of shallow circuits is easier, what is the runtime of the optimal quantum algorithm for deciding QED (or ED) for log-depth and constantdepth circuits? It is also pertinent to ask this question not just for worst-case instances of the problems, but also for the average case. LWE is assumed to be hard on-average, and thus we can use the reduction to argue that ED should be hard on average for a particular range of parameters. Can we say anything more general? What about the entropy of random quantum circuits? States produced by random circuits will typically be highly entangled and thus typically subsystems will have the maximum amount of entropy. Does this imply that all forms of entropy calculation for random circuits is easy?
Another open problem has to do with the question of entropy ratio rather than entropy difference. As mentioned, the entropy difference between two circuits can be amplified to constant or even polynomial in the input size, by simply repeating the circuits in parallel. However, this would not affect the ratio between the output entropies. Could our techniques be used to show that even the entropy ratio is hard to estimate based on LWE? We conjecture that the answer is yes and that this could be achieved by extending the ETCF family to include functions that are 2 m -to-1, with m = poly(n + k). The same reductions could then be used as in the entropy difference case.
In our reduction from LWE to ED O(1) we used the results of Applebaum et al in [AIK06] for compiling log-depth circuits to constant depth. An appealing feature of their construction is that the resulting circuits are "fairly local", in that they have output locality 4. In other words, each output bit depends on at most 4 input bits. They conjecture that it may also be possible to achieve output locality 3. For the purpose of constructing one-way functions, this would be optimal since it is impossible to generate one-way functions having output locality 2. We also conjecture that ED for circuits with output locality 3 is hard for quantum computers. Could the compiling technique of Applebaum et al be used to base the hardness of other natural problems in (quantum) information theory on the hardness of LWE? The fact that the entropy difference problem is complete for SZK gives a connection to cryptography, but can LWE be used to show that other natural problems are hard for a quantum computer? Going further, is it possible to have some notion of fine-grained computational complexity based on LWE?
Let us also comment on the use of LWE and ETCF functions to derive Theorem 3. LWE and lattice problems are leading candidates in the development of post-quantum cryptographic protocols due to their conjectured intractability even for quantum algorithms. Moreover, an appealing feature of LWE for cryptographic purposes, is that one can reduce worst-case instances of lattice problems to average-case instances of LWE [Reg09, Pei16] . Combining this with Theorem 3, means that average-case instances (relative to a certain distribution over input circuits) of ED O(1) will also be "at least as hard" as worst-case lattice problems. Thus, using LWE gives strong evidence that ED O(1) is quantum intractable. ETCF functions then provide a very natural instance of an entropy difference problem: determine whether a given function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. Such functions differ by one bit in entropy, under a uniform input, but by the injective invariance property it is at least as hard as solving LWE to tell which is which. It is then only necessary, for our results, to show that these functions can be evaluated by circuits of constant depth. As mentioned, this can be achieved in a relatively straightforward manner by first showing that the functions can be evaluated in log depth and then using the compiling technique of Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz to achieve constant depth.
Given the relevance of the von Neumann entropy for quantum gravity research, it is natural to ask what impact our results have for the AdS/CFT correspondence. As previously mentioned, if states on the boundary are described by log-depth tensor networks according to MERA, then computing the entropy for these states should inform the bulk geometry contained within a boundary. If computing the entropy of the boundary is difficult even for quantum computers, then this poses a challenge to the quantum version of the Extended Church Turing thesis. That is, in some sense, quantum gravitational systems cannot be simulated efficiently by a quantum computer. Bouland, Fefferman and Vazirani have also explored this challenge to the thesis from the perspective of the wormhole growth paradox using the tools of computational complexity [BFV19] . In particular, they showed that one can prepare computationally pseudorandom states on the boundary CFT. These are efficiently preparable ensembles of quantum states that require exponential complexity to distinguish from each other. Importantly, the states can have different circuit complexities and under the AdS/CFT correspondence this would correspond to different wormhole lengths. An observer in the bulk could, in principle, determine the length of a wormhole, however the circuit complexity of the boundary states should be computationally intractable to determine. They conclude that either the map from bulk to boundary in the AdS/CFT duality is exponentially complex, or a quantum computer cannot efficiently simulate such a system.
With our final result in Theorem 4 as a basis, we can make tentative connections to the AdS/CFT duality and reach a similar conclusion to the Bouland et al result. If one can have ground states of differing entanglement entropy, based on LWE, for a CFT Hamiltonian then this will correspond to differing bulk geometries. An observer in the bulk can, in principle, efficiently differentiate between these geometries. Based on this, we can devise an experiment that allows for the efficient estimation of the ground state entanglement entropy of our Hamiltonian. We conjecture that unless the AdS/CFT bulk to boundary map is exponentially complex, this experiment would violate the intractability assumption of LWE. We leave it open whether one can more formally describe our experiment by giving a Hamiltonian for the CFT whose grounds states encode the hard problem, instead of just positing that the CFT is prepared in one of those states.
Preliminaries 2.1 Notation
We write N for the set of natural numbers, Z for the set of integers, Z q for the set of integers modulo q, R for the set of real numbers, H for a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, using indices H A , H B to specify distinct spaces. L(H) is the set of linear operators on H. We write Tr(·) for the trace, and Tr B : L(H A ⊗ H B ) → L(H A ) for the partial trace. Pos(H) is the set of positive semidefinite operators and D(H) = {X ∈ Pos(H) : Tr(X) = 1} the set of density matrices (also called states).
Given
the fidelity, and S(A) = −T r(A log A) the Von Neumann entropy.
Probability distributions will generally be over n-bit binary strings and so will be functions D : {0, 1} n → [0, 1] for which D(x) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ {0, 1} n and x∈{0,1} n D(x) = 1. The Shannon entropy of a distribution is
(1) Here we are abusing notation since S denotes both the Shannon entropy and the Von Neumann entropy and it will be clear from the context which notion of entropy is being used. We will also use h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] to denote the binary entropy function h( ) = − 1 log( ) − 1 1− log(1 − ). We write Supp(D) = {x | D(x) > 0} for the support of the distribution D. The Hellinger distance between two distributions is:
(2)
Note that:
where || · || T V is the total variation distance. For a finite set S, we write x ← U S to mean that x is drawn uniformly at random from S. In general, x ← χ S will mean that x was drawn according to the distribution χ : S → [0, 1] from S. We say that a function µ : N → R is negligible if it goes to 0 faster than any inverse-polynomial function, i.e. for any polynomial p : N → R, p(n)µ(n) → n→∞ 0.
Complexity theory
In this paper we reference the standard complexity classes describing polynomial-time probabilistic and quantum computation, respectively, denoted BPP and BQP. In addition, we also utilize the complexity classes for computations that can be performed by polynomial-size circuits having polylogarithmic depth, NC for classical circuits and QNC for quantum circuits, logarithmic depth NC 1 and QNC 1 , as well as constant depth, NC 0 and QNC 0 , respectively. For formal definitions of these classes, as well as others mentioned in this paper, we refer to the Complexity Zoo [zoo] .
Here, we provide the definition of QSZK, as it is the focus of our main results:
Definition 1 (Quantum Statistical Zero-Knowledge (QSZK)). A promise problem (L yes , L no ) belongs to QSZK if there exists a uniform family of polynomial-size quantum circuits V = {V n } n>0 , known as a verifier such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• Completeness. For each x ∈ L yes , there exists a prover P (x) exchanging polynomially-many quantum messages with V (x) that makes V (x) accept with probability greater than 2/3,
• Soundness. For each x ∈ L no , any prover P (x) exchanging polynomially-many quantum messages with V (x) will make V (x) accept with probability at most 1/3,
• Zero-Knowledge. There exists a uniform family of polynomial-size quantum circuits S = {S n } n>0 , known as a simulator, as well as a negligible function ε : N → [0, 1] such that for all x ∈ L yes , S(x) produces a state that is ε-close in trace distance to the transcript of V (x) ↔ P (x).
As was shown by Ben-Aroya, Schwartz and Ta-Shma [BASTS10] , the following problem is QSZK-complete under polynomial-time reductions:
Definition 2 (Quantum Entropy Difference (QED) [BASTS10] ). Let C 1 and C 2 be quantum circuits acting on n + k qubits such that depth(C 1 ) is O(log(n + k)) and depth(C 2 ) is O(log(n + k)). Define the following n-qubit mixed states:
Given n, k and descriptions of C 1 and C 2 as input, decide whether:
or S(ρ 2 ) ≥ S(ρ 1 ) + 1/poly(n + k)
promised that one of these is the case.
Note that the entropy difference can always be made constant by considering parallel 6 repeated version of C 1 and C 2 . Specifically, if the entropy difference for C 1 and C 2 is D = 1/poly(n+k), then the difference for C ⊗D 1 and C ⊗D 2 , acting on (n + k)D qubits and when tracing out kD qubits, will be O(1). For this reason, throughout this paper we will consider the entropy difference problem (and all its variants) with a constant entropy difference.
The classical/probabilistic analogues of the above definitions are represented by the class SZK and the Entropy Difference (ED) problem. In analogy to QED, ED is defined as the problem of distinguishing the output entropies of classical circuits having uniformly random inputs. It was shown in [GV99] that ED is SZK-complete.
Learning-With-Errors and Extended Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions
In this section we give definitions for the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev [Reg09], as well as Extended Trapdoor Claw-Free Functions (ETCF). Most of this section is taken from [BCM + 18]. An informal description of LWE is that it is the problem of solving an approximate system of linear equations. In other words, given a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , as well as a vector y = Ax + e (mod q), with y ∈ Z m q , x ∈ Z n q and e ← χ m Z m (here χ denotes a probability distribution that is described below), the problem is to determine x.
More formally, let us start by defining the truncated Gaussian distribution. For a positive real B and positive integer q, the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Z q with parameter B is supported on {x ∈ Z q : x ≤ B} and has density
For a positive integer m, the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m q with parameter B is supported on {x ∈ Z m q : x ≤ B √ m} and has density
Definition 3 (Learning-With-Errors [BCM + 18]). For a security parameter λ, let n, m, q ∈ N be integer functions of λ. Let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over Z. The LW E n,m,q,χ problem is to distinguish between the distributions (A, As + e (mod q)) and (A, u), where A is uniformly random in Z n×m q , s is a uniformly random row vector in Z n q , e is a row vector drawn at random from the distribution χ m , and u is a uniformly random vector in Z m q . Often we consider the hardness of solving LWE for any function m such that m is at most a polynomial in n log q. This problem is denoted LW E n,q,χ .
As shown in [Reg09, PRSD17] , for any α > 0 such that σ = αq ≥ 2 √ n the LW E n,q,D Zq ,σ problem, where D Zq,σ is the discrete Gaussian distribution, is at least as hard (under a quantum poly-time reduction) as approximating the shortest independent vector problem (SIVP) to within a factor of γ =Õ(n/α) in worst case dimension n lattices. The so-called "LWE assumption" is that no quantum polynomial-time procedure can solve the LW E n,q,χ problem with more than a negligible advantage in λ, even when given access to a quantum polynomial-size state depending on the parameters n, m, q and χ of the problem.
For the reduction from LWE to QED log we make use of "extended trapdoor claw-free functions (ETCF)," introduced in [Mah18] . Briefly, an ETCF consists of two families of functions, denoted F and G. The first family, F, is referred to as a "trapdoor injective family" and consists of a pair of functions (f k,0 , f k,1 ) that have disjoint ranges. The second, G, is referred to as a "noisy trapdoor claw-free family (NTCF)", introduced in [BCM + 18], and consists of a pair of functions (g k,0 , g k,1 ) that have overlapping ranges 7 , essentially acting as a one-way 2-to-1 function. While we do not require all the properties of ETCF functions for our results, we give the full definitions of these functions for completeness.
The following definitions are taken from [Mah18, Section 4], with similar definitions in [BCM + 18, Section 3]. Note that we have flipped the naming convention of these functions with respect to how they were originally defined in [Mah18, BCM + 18]. In other words, for us the F family is the injective family and the G family is the NTCF one, whereas in the cited results this is reversed. This was done in order to be consistent with referenced injective functions denoted f from other results. We start with the definition of the NTCF family:
Definition 4 (NTCF Family [Mah18, BCM + 18]). Let λ be a security parameter. Let X and Y be finite sets. Let K G be a finite set of keys. A family of functions
is called a noisy trapdoor claw-free (NTCF) family if the following conditions hold:
1. Efficient Function Generation. There exists an efficient probabilistic algorithm GEN G which generates a key k ∈ K G together with a trapdoor t k :
2. Trapdoor Injective Pair. For all keys k ∈ K G the following conditions hold.
(a) Trapdoor:
(b) Injective pair: There exists a perfect matching R k ⊆ X ×X such that g k,0 (x 0 ) = g k,1 (x 1 ) if and only if (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ R k .
3. Efficient Range Superposition. For all keys k ∈ K G and b ∈ {0, 1} there exists a function
(b) There exists an efficient deterministic procedure CHK G that, on input k, b ∈ {0, 1},
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, returns 1 if y ∈ Supp(g k,b (x)) and 0 otherwise. Note that CHK G is not provided the trapdoor t k .
(c) For every k and b ∈ {0, 1},
for some negligible function µ(·). Here H 2 is the Hellinger distance. Moreover, there exists an efficient procedure SAMP G that on input k and b ∈ {0, 1} prepares the state
4. Adaptive Hardcore Bit. For all keys k ∈ K G the following conditions hold, for some integer w that is a polynomially bounded function of λ.
(a) For all b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X , there exists a set G k,b,
is negligible, and moreover there exists an efficient algorithm that checks for membership in G k,b,x given k, b, x and the trapdoor t k .
(b) There is an efficiently computable injection J : X → {0, 1} w , such that J can be inverted efficiently on its range, and such that the following holds. If
then for any quantum polynomial-time procedure A there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that
We now define the trapdoor injective family. 
is called a trapdoor injective family if the following conditions hold:
1. Efficient Function Generation. There exists an efficient probabilistic algorithm GEN F which generates a key k ∈ K F together with a trapdoor t k :
3. Efficient Range Superposition. For all keys k ∈ K F and b ∈ {0, 1}
(a) There exists an efficient deterministic procedure CHK F that, on input k, b ∈ {0, 1},
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, outputs 1 if y ∈ Supp(f k,b (x)) and 0 otherwise. Note that CHK F is not provided the trapdoor t k .
(b) There exists an efficient procedure SAMP F that on input k and b ∈ {0, 1} returns the state
Definition 6 (Injective Invariance [Mah18] ). A noisy trapdoor claw-free family G is injective invariant if there exists a trapdoor injective family F such that:
1. The algorithms CHK F and SAMP F are the same as the algorithms CHK G and SAMP G .
2. For all quantum polynomial-time procedures A, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that Pr
Definition 7 (Extended Trapdoor Claw-Free Family [Mah18] ). A noisy trapdoor claw-free family G is an extended trapdoor claw-free family if:
2. For all k ∈ K G and d ∈ {0, 1} w , let:
For all quantum polynomial-time procedures A, there exists a negligible function µ(·) and a string d ∈ {0, 1} w such that
Randomized encodings
To prove the reduction from LWE to the constant depth version of the entropy difference problem, we make use of randomized encodings. The following definitions and results are taken from [AIK06]:
Definition 8 (Uniform randomized encoding [AIK06] ). Let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be a polynomialtime computable function and l(n) an output length function such that |f (x)| = l(|x|), for every x ∈ {0, 1} * . We say that a functionf : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is a δ(n)-correct, ε(n)-private randomized encoding of f , if it satisfies the following properties:
• Length regularity. There exist polynomially-bounded and efficiently computable length functions m(n), s(n) such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n and r ∈ {0, 1} m(n) we have that |f (x, r)| = s(n).
• Efficient evaluation. There exists a polynomial-time evaluation algorithm that, given x ∈ {0, 1} * and r ∈ {0, 1} m(n) , outputsf (x, r).
• δ-correctness. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm C, called a decoder, such that for every input x ∈ {0, 1} n ,
• ε-privacy. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S, called a simulator such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n and r ← U {0, 1} m(n) ,
Correctness (and privacy, respectively) can be perfect when δ = 0 (ε = 0, respectively), or statistical when δ(n) (ε(n), respectively) is a negligible function in n. Thus, a perfect randomized encoding is one that has perfect correctness and perfect privacy 9 . Similarly, a statistical randomized encoding is one that has statistical correctness and statistical privacy.
Lemma 1 (Unique randomness [AIK06] ). Supposef is a perfect randomized encoding of f . Then, (a) for any input x,f (x, ·) is injective, i.e. there are no distinct r, r , such thatf (x, r) =f (x, r ),
Theorem 5 ( [AIK06]). Any function f ∈ NC 1 admits a perfect randomized encoding in NC 0 4 . Moreover, constructing the randomized encoding of f can be achieved in time polynomial in the size of the circuit that evaluates f .
Here NC 0 4 denotes the set of uniform constant-depth circuits having output locality 4. In other words, each output bit depends on at most 4 input bits.
Entropy difference for shallow circuits
In this section we examine the hardness of the entropy difference problem for circuits whose depth scales at most (poly)logarithmically with the size of the input. We start by formally defining the entropy difference problem, in both the classical and the quantum cases, for circuits with depth scaling as δ(n), for inputs of size n and where δ : N → N, is a monotonically increasing function:
Definition 9 (ED δ ). Let C 1 and C 2 be reversible boolean circuits acting on n + k bits such that
denote the output distributions of the circuits when restricted to the first n output bits and with the input chosen uniformly at random. Given n, k and descriptions of C 1 and C 2 as input, decide whether:
promised that one of these is the case 10 .
Definition 10 (QED δ ). Let C 1 and C 2 be quantum circuits acting on n + k qubits such that depth(C 1 ) ≤ δ(n + k), depth(C 2 ) ≤ δ(n + k). Define the following n-qubit mixed states:
10 As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, the gap in entropy difference can be 1/poly(n + k), but this can always be made constant by simply taking parallel repeated versions of the circuits and using the fact that entropy is additive. We restrict to the case where the entropy difference is at least 1, unless otherwise specified. 11 We slightly abuse notation here since O(log(n)) and O(1) are sets of functions and so, correspondingly, ED log (QED log ) and ED O(1) (QED O(1) ) will also be sets of problems. However, our results are valid for any instances of the problems in these classes.
Entropy difference is easier for shallow circuits
With the above definitions, let us now address the question of whether ED polylog (QED polylog ) is SZK-complete (QSZK-complete). From the above lemma, we see that this is the same as asking whether SZK polylog = SZK (QSZK polylog = QSZK). In other words, can any SZK (QSZK) protocol be turned into a protocol having polylog-depth circuits for the simulator and verifier? Providing an unconditional negative answer seems difficult without proving explicit circuit lower-bounds. Instead, we will give "complexity-theoretic evidence" that the answer is no. We first show that there exists an oracle, O, such that, relative to O, SZK polylog = SZK (QSZK polylog = QSZK).
Proof. The proof will be primarily for the quantum case, since the classical case is analogous, though we will specify whenever there is a distinction between the two. The oracle in our proof will be identical to the one of Chia, Chung and Lai [CCL19] , showing the separation
Their oracle provides access to a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n that is promised to be either 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. However, the oracle does not give direct query access to f . Instead, the oracle allows for the querying of d + 1 functions
.., f d−1 are 1-to-1 functions and f d is either a 1-to-1 function or a 2-to-1 function depending on whether f is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. This is referred to as a d-shuffling oracle. Its purpose is to force any algorithm that attempts to query f to first evaluate the d + 1 functions. This is achieved by having the image of each function be a random subset of its codomain. In other words, each function will be defined as f i : S
The input domain, however, will be a set S 0 ⊆ {0, 1} n chosen uniformly at random from subsets of n-bit strings. Thus, the image of f 1 on S 0 will be Im S 0 (f 1 ) = f 1 (S 0 ) = S 1 and in general
The problem that Chia, Chung and Lai define relative to this oracle is to determine whether the function f : S 0 → S d+1 is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. In the latter case, the function also has Simon's property so that the problem (called d-shuffling Simon's problem, or d-SSP) can be solved efficiently in quantum polynomial time, thus showing containment in BQP O . Using the properties of the dshuffling oracle it is possible to show that no quantum circuit of depth smaller than d can solve the problem, even when alternating these quantum circuits with classical circuits of polynomial depth. Thus, taking d = O(n) is sufficient to show that the problem is not contained BPP QNC O .
For the proof of our result we also consider the d-SSP problem. Since we already know that the problem is in BQP O this immediately implies that the problem is also in QSZK O . For the classical case, we would also need to show that the problem is contained in SZK O . This follows from the fact that ED is in SZK and the problem of determining whether a function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 reduces to ED 12 . We therefore need to show that the problem is not contained in SZK O polylog and QSZK O polylog . To do this, consider a QSZK polylog protocol in which the verifier, the prover and the simulator all have access to the oracle O. In such a protocol, the verifier and the simulator are circuits of depth O(polylog(n)) that generically consist of alternating sequences of polylog-depth circuits and calls to the oracle, as shown in Figure 1 . For a fixed input state that starts off uncorrelated with the oracle, let us examine the output state of such a circuit in the cases when the function is injective and when it is a 2-to-1 function. We will denote the oracle as O(f ) in the former case and as O(g) in the latter 13 . We also denote the circuit under consideration, when given access to the oracle, as C O(f ) and C O(g) , respectively. These can be expressed as follows with m = polylog(n) and where each U i is a circuit of depth one. We denote the input state to the circuit as 14 |ψ(0) . We will also write |ψ
Following a similar analysis to that of [CCL19] , we have that
which can be extended to
Both of these equations follow from the triangle inequality. We next have that
Finally, as was shown in [CCL19, Theorem 6.1], for i ≤ d,
and since m = polylog(n), d = O(n), for sufficiently large n, m < d, hence
If we now consider C O to be the simulator circuit in a QSZK polylog (SZK polylog ) protocol, we see that the simulator produces nearly identical transcripts irrespective of whether the oracle function is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. This means that, for the "yes" instances (the function being 1-to-1), the transcript that the verifier circuit acts on, upon its interaction with the prover, is almost completely uncorrelated with the oracle itself. Stated differently, the transcript is poly(n)/2 n -close in trace distance to a transcript for a "no" instance. Thus, the interaction with the prover can provide the verifier with at most a poly(n)/2 n advantage in deciding the problem correctly. Since the verifier circuit itself is polylogarithmic in depth, from the above analysis (and the result of [CCL19] ), it follows that if the oracle function type is equiprobable to be 1-to-1 or 2-to-1, the resulting QSZK polylog (SZK polylog ) protocol will decide correctly with probability at most 1/2 + poly(n)/2 n . This concludes the proof.
It should be noted that, following [CCL19] , the above result extends to circuits of depth strictly less than d. The key insight of the proof is the fact that the shuffling oracle requires circuits of depth at least d in order to obtain an output that is non-negligibly correlated with the oracle type. Intuitively, if we were to look strictly at instances of ED polylog and QED polylog in which the circuits under consideration can query the oracle, the number of queries is too small for there to be any noticeable difference in the output entropies. Thus, relative to the shuffling oracle, ED polylog and QED polylog are strictly weaker than ED and QED.
Let us now consider a different argument for why it is unlikely that entropy difference with shallow circuits is as hard as with general poly-size circuits. We will focus specifically on the quantum case for circuits of logarithmic depth and show the following:
Theorem 7. If there exists a polynomial-time reduction from a QSZK protocol with a log-depth verifier to a QSZK log protocol which preserves the transcript of the QSZK protocol, then BQP = BPP QNC 1 .
Proof. It is straightforward to show that BQP ⊆ QSZK: the quantum verifier ignores the prover and can decide any language in BQP . However, one can also give a QSZK protocol for any language in BQP where there is non-trivial interaction between a prover and verifier. Furthermore, we show that such a protocol only requires the verifier's circuit to be log depth. To show this, we adapt the proof by Rosgen that QIP only requires log depth quantum verifiers [Ros08] .
Given a polynomial-time quantum circuit on n qubits of the form C = U m U m−1 ...U 1 , the following state |ψ U can be constructed by another BQP circuit,
Notice the similarity to a Feynman-Kitaev history state except where one takes the tensor product of unitaries applied to the input, and not the superposition. The state |ψ U stores the final state of the circuit above in the rightmost n qubits. Therefore, any language in BQP can be decided by measuring the relevant qubit in these rightmost n qubits in |ψ U . Now we can have a QSZK protocol where an honest prover gives the verifier the state |ψ U , and thus a verifier has the ability to decide any language in BQP when given this state. In the case of a dishonest prover, we can use the techniques described by Rosgen, to verify that the state given by the prover is |ψ U . For convenience of explanation, we divide the state given by the prover up into m "registers" of n qubits, where the first register should be in the state |0...0 , the second register in the state U 1 |0...0 , and so on. The idea for verifying that the state is |ψ U is to pairwise compare the jth and (j + 1)th registers with SWAP tests. More precisely the verification circuit will apply U j+1 to the jth register and perform a SWAP test on the jth and (j + 1)th registers: if the states are the same then swapping leaves the states invariant and the circuit accepts, otherwise it rejects. Therefore, after n SWAP tests of this form, if all tests accept, then with high probability the state is |ψ U . Importantly, all of the SWAP tests to compare registers can be done in log depth [Ros08] , thus the verifier's circuit is a log depth quantum circuit.
In the above protocol we have outlined how the verifier can verify the state |ψ U , but we have not shown that it satisfies the property of statistical zero-knowledge. Note that the state |ψ U produced by the prover (such that an input is accepted) can be generated by a polynomial time quantum circuit. Therefore, in the case of a QSZK protocol, the simulator could produce this state |ψ U , and since this state is the whole transcript of the protocol, the protocol has the property of zero-knowledge.
If we assume that there exists a polynomial-time reduction from a QSZK protocol to a QSZK log protocol which preserves the transcript of the QSZK protocol, then the above QSZK protocol for deciding BQP can be turned into a QSZK log protocol. Therefore, a simulator S must be able to produce a state very close to |ψ U with a log-depth quantum circuit, in the case that the input x is in the language L yes . Furthermore, since BQP is closed under complement, we can take the complement of the language above, and have a QSZK log protocol for this, and thus another simulator S that produces a state close to |ψ U for x ∈ L no . Now we have the situation where if the conditions of the theorem hold, we have two log-depth quantum circuits corresponding to the simulators S and S above that can be used to decide membership of a language in BQP: if x ∈ L yes then S will produce the state |ψ U , but S could produce anything; if x ∈ L no then S produces the correct state |ψ U . To decide which is which, a verifier can apply the SWAP tests outlined above individually on both of the states generate by S and S : at least one of the two states will satisfy the tests and correctly accept or reject. We can now leverage these observations to prove the theorem.
To collect the observations together, we have pointed out that if the conditions of the theorem hold, there are log-depth quantum circuits S and S that generate states |ψ U , which can be used by a log-depth quantum circuit to decide membership in BQP. Thus we could decide any language in BQP with a BPP QNC 1 algorithm in the following way: a BPP machine computes the reduction from a QSZK protocol to a QSZK log protocol, feeds the circuit descriptions of the log-depth simulators S and S to a QNC 1 oracle, which can then produce states of the form |ψ U , and carry out the necessary SWAP tests to verify this state. If the SWAP tests are passed for at least one of the two states produced by S and S , then the accept/reject measurement is performed on it (again by the oracle), and the algorithm accepts if the oracle accepts, or rejects otherwise.
It is worthwhile pointing out that this trick of deciding languages in BQP with a BPP QNC 1 algorithm does not obviously generalise to other complexity classes. First, we would need that there are quantum statistical zero-knowledge protocols for the class, and use the property of closure under complementation. Naturally QSZK satisfies both of these properties, but an arbitrary protocol for languages in QSZK has multiple rounds of communication between prover and verifier. Our construction uses the fact that a QSZK protocol for any language in BQP has a single round of communication from prover to verifier, which facilitates verification of a state in log depth. It is far from obvious how to construct such a verification procedure for an arbitrary language in QSZK.
We can ask about the possibility of a classical analogue of Theorem 7. That is, if there is a reduction from a SZK protocol to one with a log-depth verifier and simulator, does this imply that polynomial-time classical computation can be parallelised to log depth? This would then imply something about the hardness of entropy distinguishability for probability distributions from logdepth classical circuits. However, it's not clear how to do this since we cannot use the history state construction of Rosgen [Ros08] for classical circuits. For one thing, it is not obvious how an SZK protocol would work with communication only from the prover to the verifier. Indeed, it is a feature of quantum interactive proof systems that they can be parallelised to a constant number of rounds of interaction, but this parallelisation is not known to be a feature of classical interactive proof systems.
Hardness based on Learning-With-Errors
In the previous subsection we showed that the polylogarithmic-depth version of the entropy difference problem, in both the classical and quantum case, is unlikely to be as hard as the polynomialdepth variant. This raises the question of whether the problem becomes tractable for polynomialtime classical or quantum algorithms. Here we give indication that the answer is no by proving a reduction from LWE to ED log . Using techniques from [AIK06], we then strengthen this result by also showing a reduction from LWE to ED O(1) . We begin with the log-depth case:
Proof. The proof uses the ETCF functions defined in Subsection 2.3. As mentioned, an ETCF family consists of an injective function and a 2-to-1 (or claw-free) function and there exists a reduction from LWE to the problem of distinguishing the two functions given their descriptions 15 . By showing that the two functions can be evaluated using circuits of logarithmic depth, we will extend this reduction to ED log . While it has already been shown that certain cryptographic functions based on LWE can be performed in NC 1 [BPR12] , our result requires that we show this for the circuits that we construct from an ETCF function family.
The ETCF functions we consider will be the same as the ones from [Mah18, BCM + 18]:
Zq ,B Z m as in Definition 3. These functions will be ETCF even when A, e and u are chosen at random as follows: , where C T is a fixed constant and B is chosen so that B /B is super-polynomial in n. Since it was already shown in [Mah18] that the above functions are ETCF, we need only show that they can be evaluated by log-depth circuits.
First of all note that the functions from Equation 29 output probability distributions, whereas the circuits in ED log need to output fixed outcomes. We will fix this by making the error, e, be part of the input. We cannot, however, make it directly part of the input since the input to the circuits in ED log is distributed uniformly, whereas e must be drawn from a truncated Gaussian distribution, D m Zq,B . Instead, we will have as part of the input a string e u which we will turn into a Gaussian sample using a log-depth circuit denoted Gaussify. Implementing this procedure can be achieved using, for instance, the algorithm of Peikert from [Pei10] . Gaussify satisfies the property that if e u ← U Z m q then e = Gaussify(e u ) is distributed according to the truncated Gaussian distribution D m Zq,B . The ED log circuits we construct will therefore have the form
where A, s, e and u are fixed. Essentially, one is given A, u and As + e and one has to construct the above circuits and ensure that they have logarithmic depth. Note that the input length for each circuit is (m + n) log(q) + 1. Following [Mah18, BCM + 18] we will assume that m = Ω(n log(q)), so that what we need to ensure is that the circuit depth is O(log(m log(q))). The LWE assumption states that it should be computationally intractable to distinguish u from As + e , when given A. However, as we will show, the above circuits will have different entropies in their outputs (when the inputs are chosen uniformly at random). Intuitively this is because one function is 1-to-1 and the other is approximately 2-to-1 and so the two cases could be distinguished if we have the ability to solve ED log . This is the essence of the reduction. Let us take stock of all the operations performed by these circuits and why they are all in NC 1 :
1. Addition and multiplication modulo q can be performed in logarithmic depth with respect to the input size (which in this case is O(log(q))) [Wal64] , so that this operation requires only depth O(log(log(q))). For vectors in Z m q , component-wise addition can be performed in parallel by increasing the width by a factor of m. Thus, the overall depth remains O(log(log(q))).
The dot-product between two vectors in Z m
q requires depth O(log(m log(q))). One first computes the component-wise product of the two vectors. This is the same as componentwise addition and can be performed in O(log(log(q))) depth. One then adds together all of the results (modulo q) and this can be performed in O(log(m log(q))) depth with a divideand-conquer strategy 17 .
3. Matrix-vector multiplication with matrices in Z n×m q and vectors in Z n q can be performed in depth O(log(m log(q))). Start by copying the vector m times (one copy for each row in the matrix). This can be done in depth O(log(m log(q))) with a divide-and-conquer strategy. Then perform the inner products between each row of the input matrix and a corresponding copy of the vector. The inner products can be performed in parallel and each requires O(log(m log(q))) depth. Thus, the resulting circuit will have O(log(m log(q))) depth.
4.
Gaussify can be performed in depth O(log(m log(q))) as shown in [Pei10] . The procedure from [Pei10] requires a pre-processing step of O(m 3 log 2 (q)) operations. This will be done as part of the polynomial-time reduction that generates the ED log instance so that the circuits C f and C g already contain the results of this pre-processing step. The actual sampling procedure requires O(m 2 ) multiplications and additions modulo q which can be performed in parallel requiring depth O(log(log(q))). Collecting the results will then require depth at most O(log(m log(q))).
This shows that C f , C g ∈ NC 1 . We now estimate the entropies S(C f ) and S(C g ) when the inputs of the circuits are chosen uniformly at random. We will consider A to be a matrix of full rank 18 , n. Given that x ← U Z n q and since A is full rank, we have that Ax ← U Im(A), where Im(A) denotes the image of A. Note that |Im(A)| = q n . For C f , we can choose u such that the distributions Ax+u and Ax have no overlap 19 . Thus, Ax+b·u will be uniform over {0, 1}×Im(A) and have n · log(q) + 1 bits of entropy. Lastly, we need to account for the Gaussian error. Since this term appears in both C f and C g , we will simply denote its contribution as S Gaussian . We therefore have that S(C f ) = n · log(q) + 1 + S Gaussian .
For the case of C g the difference will be due to the term b · (As + e ). Note that this leads to overlap among different inputs. Specifically C g (0, x, e u ) = C g (1, x − s, e u ), where e u is such that Gaussify(e u ) = Gaussify(e u ) − e . This condition on e u is true on all but a negligible fraction of error vectors (as a result of taking B /B to be super-polynomial in n) [Mah18, BCM + 18]. The circuit C g will therefore behave like a 2-to-1 function on all but a negligible fraction of the input domain. We therefore have that S(C g ) = n · log(q) + S Gaussian + µ(n), where µ(n) is a negligible function. For sufficiently large n, the µ(n) term will be less than 1 and we therefore have that the entropy difference between C f and C g is at least a positive constant, as desired 20 .
To complete the proof, note that the reduction we have just described constructs circuits with different entropies starting from an ETCF family (and specifically starting from an LWE instance (A, As + e ) and a uniformly random vector u). However, being able to distinguish between the output entropies of the circuits allows us to determine which of the two functions is 1-to-1 and which is 2-to-1. By the injective invariance property of ETCF functions (Definition 6), this is as hard as LWE, concluding the proof.
It is worth mentioning that in the above proof we essentially picked "worst-case" instances of A, s, e and u. However, all of the above arguments hold with high probability when
This means that
Corollary 1. ED log is hard-on-average, based on LWE when the input circuits have the structure given in Equations 30, 31 and are chosen at random according to
18 For LWE, the matrix A is chosen uniformly at random from Z n×m q and so will be full rank, with high probability. 19 Similar to the choice of A, this will be true for most choices of u. 20 The entropy difference can be made larger by simply repeating the circuits in parallel. However, an alternate approach presented by the use of ETCF functions is to instead consider the circuits:
Cg(b1, b2, x, eu) = Ax + b1 · (As1 + e 1 ) + b2 · (As2 + e 2 ) + Gaussify(eu) (mod q)
Here f is still a 1-to-1 function, however g is 4-to-1 so that the entropy difference for these circuits will be 2−negl(n). This construction can be generalised so that, for any constant k, the function g can be made into a 2 k -to-1 function.
In the previous proof we saw that the ETCF functions based on LWE can be evaluated by circuits of logarithmic depth. It seems unlikely, however, that the same functions could be evaluated by circuits of constant depth. To get around this issue, we make use of the compiling techniques from [AIK06] that can take a one-way function with log-depth circuit complexity and map it to a corresponding one-way function having constant-depth circuit complexity. This is achieved through the use of a randomized polynomial encoding, in which the value of a function is encoded in a series of points that can be computed using a constant-depth circuit. Formally, we have that,
Proof. As shown in Theorem 8, the circuits C f and C g constructed from the ETCF functions, can be evaluated in log depth. Using Theorem 5, from [AIK06] , this means that there exist randomized encodingsĈ f andĈ g for the two circuits, that can be computed in NC 0 4 . To prove our reduction we need to show two things: that the randomized encodings of C f and C g preserve the injective invariance property (i.e. distinguishing between the randomized encodings is as hard as LWE); that the randomized encodings are 1-to-1 and 2-to-1 functions, respectively. This last condition is required so that when we evaluateĈ f andĈ g with uniform inputs, it is still the case thatĈ f has more entropy in its output thanĈ g .
Showing that injective invariance is satisfied is immediate. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists an algorithm that has non-negligible advantage in distinguishingĈ f and C g . It is easy to see that this leads to an efficient algorithm for distinguishing C f and C g with non-negligible advantage. Given instances of C f and C g we can construct the randomized encod-ingsĈ f andĈ g . This can be done in polynomial time, according to Theorem 5. We then use our distinguisher on the randomized encodings and this then allows us to distinguish between C f and C g which contradicts the injective invariance property.
We now show that the randomized encodings are 1-to-1 and 2-to-1, respectively. Recall first that the randomized encodings take two arguments, x and r. First, from Lemma 1 we know that for any fixed input x, the encodings are injective in the second argument. In addition, the perfect correctness property (from Definition 8) guarantees that there are simulators S f and S g such that S f (Ĉ f (x, r)) = C f (x) and S g (Ĉ g (x, r)) = C g (x), for all x and r. This ensures that if C f is injective thenĈ f will also be injective. It also ensures that whenever there exists a collision in C g , i.e. x 1 , x 2 such that C g (x 1 ) = C g (x 2 ), there will be a corresponding collision forĈ g , i.e. C g (x 1 , r 1 ) =Ĉ g (x 2 , r 2 ), for all r 1 and r 2 . It follows that the randomized encodingsĈ f andĈ g will have the same entropy difference as C f and C g , concluding the proof.
Just as with the log-depth case, we also have:
is hard-on-average, based on LWE when the input circuits have the structure given in Equations 30, 31 and are chosen at random according to
Proof. The argument is the same as for the log-depth case: for most choices of the circuit parameters (i.e. the matrix A, the vectors s and u and the error vector e ), we obtain instances of the circuits that satisfy the injective invariance property. As the above proof shows, this remains true for the randomized encodings of these functions as well.
In the above proofs, we didn't explicitly make use of the fact that the circuits are reversible, though the same results hold in those cases as well (provided we trace out the ancilla required to performed the reversible gates). Since classical reversible circuits are a particular kind of quantum circuits, these results have the corollary that:
Proof. Follows from Theorem 9 together with the fact that ED O(1) ≤ P QED O(1) .
Hamiltonian quantum entropy difference
In this section we consider a Hamiltonian analogue of QED which we call Hamiltonian Quantum Entropy Difference (HQED). The problem will be to estimate the entanglement entropy difference between the ground states of two local Hamiltonians. Equivalently, if we trace out parts of the ground states and examine the resulting reduced states, we want to know which of the two has higher Von Neumann entropy. Formally:
Definition 12 (HQED). Let H 1 and H 2 be local Hamiltonians acting on n + k qubits, whose ground states are |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 . Define the following n-qubit mixed states:
Given n, k and descriptions of H 1 and H 2 as input, decide whether:
promised that one of these is the case. For the cases where either of the two Hamiltonians has a degenerate groundspace, |ψ j will denote a state in the groundspace for which S(ρ j ) is minimal.
We will refer to HQED log and HQED O(1) , respectively, as instances of HQED in which the input Hamiltonians have the additional promise that purifications of the states ρ 1 and ρ 2 can be approximated (to within a 1/poly(n + k) additive error in trace distance) by quantum circuits of logarithmic and constant depth, respectively.
Theorem 10. There exists a deterministic poly-time reduction from QED to HQED (QED ≤ P HQED).
Proof. We could start the reduction by constructing Hamiltonians H 1 and H 2 such that the respective ground states |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 are Feynman-Kitaev history states for quantum circuits C 1 and C 2 respectively,
where C j = U T U T −1 ...U 1 , j ∈ {1, 2} and the states |t are the clock states in the Feyman-Kitaev history state construction. However, a priori this does not guarantee that determining the entropy difference between the reduced states of |ψ 1 and |ψ 2 implies determining the entropy difference between the reduced states created by C 1 and C 2 respectively. This is because the output state of C j constitutes only one term in the history state superposition. Furthermore, we have no information about the entropy difference between the other terms in |ψ 1 relative to their counterparts in |ψ 2 .
To resolve this, we will use a trick from [NVY18] , where a circuit can be padded at the end with identities to give more weight to the "final term" in the Feynman-Kitaev history state. We will now explain this construction. Given the input circuit C j to the problem QED, first apply N identity operators at the end of the circuit to each qubit, as depicted in Figure 2 ; we will call this the padded circuit. Clearly this does not affect the final state, but it will be useful in the reduction to HQED. We now construct the Feynman-Kitaev history state from the padded circuit, which is
Note that all unitaries U i for T + 1 ≤ i ≤ T + N , U i = I ⊗(n+k) , thus we can simplify the state |ψ j to be By the Feynman-Kitaev construction there is a local Hamiltonian, having poly(n + k) terms, for which this is a ground state. This Hamiltonian will act on n + k + N + T qubits due to the clock states |t , which are encoded in unary. Let us now examine the reduced states obtained by tracing out the clock register, which we denote as σ j . In addition, to simplify the notation, we also denote |φ j (t) = U t U t−1 ...U 1 |00...0 (with |φ j (0) = |00...0 ), so that the padded history state can be written as
Note that |φ j (T ) is the output state of the circuit C j . If we now trace out the clock register, we have
Computing the fidelity between ρ j and |φ j (T ) we get
By taking N = poly(T ), and given that T = poly(n + k), we get that
From the relationship between fidelity and trace distance this also means that
If we now trace out the k qubits from both of these states and use the fact that this is a trace non-increasing operation, we get
where ρ j is the output state of C 1 when tracing out the subsystem of k qubits and ρ j is the analogous state for the Hamiltonian H j . Next, we apply the Fannes-Audanaert inequality [Fan73, Aud07] relating trace distance and entropy, which says that if
where h is the binary entropy function. Given that = 1/poly(n + k), it follows that
By the triangle inequality we get that if S(ρ 1 ) ≥ S(ρ 2 ) + O(1), then S(ρ 1 ) ≥ S(ρ 2 ) + O(1) and if S(ρ 2 ) ≥ S(ρ 1 ) + O(1), then S(ρ 2 ) ≥ S(ρ 1 ) + O(1). Thus, from the instance of QED (n + k, k, C 1 , C 2 ) we have constructed an instance of HQED (n + k + N + T, k + N + T, H 1 , H 2 ) that preserves the entropy difference of the original circuits (up to a 1/poly(n + k) error). This concludes the proof. Proof. In the proof of Theorem 10, we constructed Hamiltonians H 1 and H 2 for which the reduced ground states, ρ 1 and ρ 2 , are close in trace distance to the output states of the QED circuits C 1 and C 2 . Furthermore, the padded construction used in the previous theorem does not alter the depth of the original circuits, since we are padding with identity gates. Thus, the depth of the circuits required to approximate ρ 1 and ρ 2 (to within additive error 1/poly(n+k) in trace distance) is upper bounded by the depth of C 1 and C 2 (as ρ 1 and ρ 2 are approximations of these states). For the cases in which these circuits are log-depth or constant-depth, respectively, we obtain instances of HQED log and HQED O(1) , respectively.
For the constant depth case, in Appendix B, we give a different construction for a local Hamiltonian for which the ground state is exactly the output of a quantum circuit from QED O(1) .
Applications to holography
Holographic duality is an idea inspired from early results of Bekenstein and Hawking showing that the entropy of a black hole is proportional to its area [Bek73, Haw71] . This connection between a quantum mechanical property, the Von Neumann entropy of a quantum state, and geometry, in the form of the black hole area, was later expanded upon through the AdS/CFT correspondence [Mal99] . Briefly, the AdS/CFT correspondence is a duality between a non-gravitational quantum field theory (the conformal field theory, or CFT) and a quantum gravitational theory that takes place in an Anti-de Sitter (AdS) space-time. The CFT is defined on the boundary of the AdS space. The purpose of the correspondence is to be able to relate physical observables in the bulk to observables on the boundary and vice versa through the so-called AdS dictionary (or bulk-to-boundary and boundary-to-bulk maps). This would allow for the derivation of predictions in the quantum gravitational bulk theory purely from a non-gravitational boundary theory.
Similar to the Bekenstein-Hawking result, Ryu and Takayanagi showed a correspondence between geometry and entanglement in AdS/CFT [RT06] . This is known as the Ryu-Takayanagi formula and it states that, to leading order, the entropy of a state on the boundary CFT is given by the area of a minimal bulk surface that encloses that state.
Since entropy is an important quantity of interest in AdS/CFT, we discuss potential implications of our result for this duality 21 In particular we propose a gedankenexperiment based on our results that gives evidence for certain instances of AdS/CFT having the AdS dictionary be computationally intractable to compute, unless LWE is tractable. A similar result was obtained by Bouland et al [BFV19] , in the context of the wormhole growth paradox. Their result also uses cryptographic techniques in the form of pseudorandom quantum states. In contrast to our setting, they only require that such states exist and are computationally indistinguishable, whereas we are using the more fine-grained LWE assumption.
Roughly speaking, the main idea here is that the Ryu-Takayanagi formula relates a quantity that we have shown is hard to compute even for shallow circuits (the entropy), to a quantity that seemingly can be efficiently computed, the area of a surface. Thus assuming that LWE is hard for polynomial time quantum computers, we arrive at a contradiction. A potential resolution is that the AdS dictionary does not efficiently translate from the bulk to the boundary.
In the following thought experiment, we will assume that CFT states can be prepared efficiently starting from descriptions of functions f and g, such as the ETCF functions used in Theorem 8, that are 1-to-1 and 2-to-1, respectively. Furthermore, it should be the case that there is a constant difference in entanglement entropy for the two types of states 22 . To give arguments for why we think this is true, first note that, as stated in Theorem 4, we can construct local Hamiltonians for which the ground states will indeed encode instances of such functions. These ground states will have different entanglement entropy depending on which function was used.
A second argument is based on the observation that certain quantum error-correcting codes serve as toy models for the AdS/CFT correspondence [PYHP15] . Specifically, as discussed in [Har17] , codes that protect against erasure errors constitute such toy models. They satisfy the property that encoded information can be recovered by acting on only a fraction of the qubits in the encoded state. As an example of this (taken from [Har17] ), if we let |ψ 123 be an encoding of |ψ on three subsystems, it should be that there exists a unitary U 12 such that
as well as corresponding unitaries U 13 and U 23 that act in a similar way. Here |χ is the maximally entangled state |χ = i |i |i . As a toy model for AdS/CFT, the state |ψ represents the quantum state of a bulk observer and |ψ will be the corresponding CFT state that lives on the boundary of the AdS space. The indices label three different subsystems on the boundary and Equation 50 simply states that the bulk information (the state |ψ ) can be recovered by acting on only part of the boundary. As shown in [Har17] , these states satisfy a Ryu-Takayanagi formula (in addition to other properties that are satisfied by AdS/CFT). Specifically, the entanglement entropy of |χ corresponds to the area of a bulk surface. One could imagine considering the states
instead of |χ , where f and g are 1-to-1 and 2-to-1, respectively. In this case the difference in entanglement entropy will be determined by whether the function that was used was 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. States such as the ones from Equation 51, or even analogous weighted superpositions of such states are efficiently preparable (according to the efficient range superposition properties from Definitions 4 and 5). Finally, note that since f and g themselves can be implemented by circuits of constant depth, as shown in Theorem 9, the quantum states derived from these functions (such as |χ f or |χ g ) could also be prepared by short depth quantum circuits. This would be consistent with a conjecture by Swingle that the underlying CFT states that lead to the Ryu-Takayanagi formula are well approximated by states resulting from MERA (multi-scale entanglement renormalization ansatz ) tensor networks [Swi12] . Such MERA states essentially have log-depth quantum circuit descriptions. Let us now describe our thought experiment.
Suppose Alice has a quantum computer and is given the description of a function, denoted h, which is promised to be either f (that is a 1-to-1) or g (that is a 2-to-1) from Equation 29. Alice is then asked whether the function she received is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. By the injective invariance property (Definition 5) this is as hard to determine as solving LWE. Suppose now that Alice uses her quantum computer to do the following:
1. She first prepares a state |ψ h CF T that is supposed to represent a CFT state whose entanglement entropy is determined by the type of function of h. In other words, if h is f , we will say that the state has high entanglement entropy and if h is g we will say it has low entanglement entropy. As discussed above, we conjecture that there should exist an efficient procedure for preparing such a state, given the function description.
By the AdS/CFT correspondence, |ψ h
CF T should be dual to a state |ψ h bulk in the bulk. In this bulk space-time, under the Ryu-Takayanagi formula the area of a certain surface γ h will be equal 23 to the entanglement entropy of |ψ h CF T . Using the AdS dictionary, Alice then considers a bulk Hamiltonian H bulk such that the time evolution of |ψ h bulk under H bulk corresponds to an observer in the bulk measuring the area of γ h . If this fictional bulk observer notices that the area of γ h is above a certain threshold (corresponding to the case of high entropy), it will "reset itself" so that at the end of the evolution it returns to the state |ψ h bulk (and so the corresponding CFT state returns to |ψ h CF T ). If, on the other hand the area is below the threshold (corresponding to low entropy) it should then map itself into a state for which the dual CFT state is "as close to orthogonal to |ψ h CF T as possible". In other words, we would like this state to be distinguishable from |ψ h CF T . A schematic illustration of the fictional bulk observer's two perspectives is shown in Figure 3 . The time required for the observer to perform the measurement should be proportional to the area 24 of γ h .
3. Using the AdS dictionary, Alice computes the boundary CFT Hamiltonian H CF T that is dual to H bulk . She then time-evolves her state |ψ h CF T with H CF T . Under the AdS/CFT correspondence the evolution of her state will be dual to the time-evolution of the bulk observer that is performing the measurement of γ h . Alice is, in effect, simulating this process on her quantum computer. 4. At the end of the evolution, Alice performs SWAP tests to check whether the state she is left with is |ψ h CF T . If this is the case, she concludes that the original function was 1-to-1, otherwise she concludes that it is 2-to-1.
If all the steps in the above procedure can be performed efficiently, then this experiment would violate the injective invariance property of ETCF functions, since it can efficiently distinguish between the two function types. Correspondingly, we would have an efficient quantum algorithm for solving LWE. Since we believe that this is unlikely, we would need to determine which of the above steps is intractable. As mentioned, we conjecture that preparing the CFT states should be efficient. The time-evolution under a Hamiltonian, that Alice has to perform, should also be efficient using standard techniques from quantum simulation [BMK10, BCK15] . One step that seems potentially problematic is step 3. Here the bulk observer needs to affect his space-time so as to map Alice's state to one of two efficiently distinguishable states. It certainly seems plausible that the bulk observer can do very different things depending on the area he measures, resulting in completely different bulk states. But it is unclear whether the resulting dual CFT states would then be distinguishable by Alice. The other possible source of intractability is the use of the AdS dictionary. If the dictionary is exponentially complex, Alice cannot determine the state that is dual to her CFT state or what her boundary Hamiltonian should be.
An important observation to make here is that the entropy difference between the two cases is constant and one could argue that we should not expect bulk observers to be able to efficiently detect such small differences in geometry. Indeed, it might be more relevant to have a scenario in which the entropy ratio is constant instead, since this would correspond to a noticeable change in area between the two cases (and would be more in line with the portrayal in Figure 3 ). As mentioned in the discussion from Section 1, we conjecture that even estimating the entropy ratio should be hard based on LWE. Specifically, by considering extensions of the ETCF functions in which the function g is taken to be 2 m -to-1, with m = poly(n + k), we would achieve a constant (or even polynomial) ratio between the entropies of the two functions. The results from the previous sections would still allow for these functions to be evaluated in constant depth, leading the desired result.
A final comment we make about the above experiment is that it does not require holographic duality to be true for our own universe. Indeed, as long as AdS/CFT is true it should in principle be possible to simulate dynamics in a "virtual" AdS space by constructing CFT states on a quantum computer and evolving them under the CFT Hamiltonian. Can instances of LWE and ETCF functions be encoded in these CFT states? We leave answering this question and formalizing the above experiment for future work. quantum advice, and ALL denotes the set of all languages [zoo] . A BQP/qpoly algorithm is a quantum algorithm that runs in polynomial time and that receives, in addition to its input, denoted x, a quantum state on poly(|x|) qubits (the advice state) that depends only on the size of the input and not on the input itself. We leverage this fact, together with the ability to efficiently estimate entropy to provide an algorithm for deciding any language.
For a given language L ⊆ {0, 1} * and input length n, let L n denote the set of strings x of length n, such that x ∈ L. We also letL n denote the strings of length n not contained in L, i.e. L n = {0, 1} n \ L n . With this notation, we define the states |ψ n Y es = 1 √ L n x∈Ln |x |ψ n N o = 1 L n x∈Ln |x (52)
to be the equal superpositions over the "yes" instances of length n and the "no" instances, respectively. Finally, we let EQ x be the following unitary operation acting on n+1 qubits (for b ∈ {0, 1}):
EQ x |y |b = |y |b ⊕ 1 if x = y |y |b otherwise (53)
Note that EQ x can be implemented with poly(|x|)-many gates.
The BQP/qpoly algorithm works as follows. Setting = 2 −n−1 , the quantum advice will consist of poly(n) copies of |ψ n Y es |ψ n N o . The algorithm then appends two qubits in the state |0 to each copy |ψ n Y es |ψ n N o to get |ψ n Y es |0 |ψ n N o |0 . Then for the input x, the algorithm applies EQ x to both |ψ n Y es |0 and |ψ n N o |0 individually, for all copies. Consider what happens if x is a "yes" instance (the "no" instance case is analogous). The resulting states will be EQ x |ψ n Y es |0 = 1 √ L n z∈Ln,z =x |z |0 + 1 L n |x |1 (54) EQ x |ψ n N o |0 = |ψ n N o |0 (55)
If we trace out the first n qubits and denote the resulting states as ρ Y and ρ N , we can see that
S(ρ N ) = 0 (57)
Since L n ≤ 2 n , we have that S(ρ Y ) ≥ 2 −n . But now, by assumption, having poly(n)-many copies of ρ Y and ρ N we can estimate the entropies of the two states to within additive error 2 −n−1 , thus being able to determine which of the two has non-zero entropy. The algorithm is therefore able to decide any language L, hence showing that BQP/qpoly = ALL. However, we know from [NY04] that BQP/qpoly = ALL (since, in particular EESPACE ⊂ BQP/qpoly) and this provides the desired contradiction.
B HQED with constant depth ground state
In the reduction from Theorem 10 we used the history state construction to approximately map the outputs of circuits C 1 and C 2 from an instance of QED to ground states of Hamiltonians H 1 and H 2 in HQED. Correspondingly, the entanglement entropy difference for the ground states of H 1 and H 2 differed from that of the output states of C 1 and C 2 by an additive term of 1/poly(n + k).
Here we give an alternate reduction for the case where C 1 and C 2 are of constant depth d, based on a recent result of Bravyi, Gosset and Movassagh [BGM19] . This reduction has the appealing feature that the resulting Hamiltonians will have as ground states exactly C 1 |00...0 and C 2 |00...0 , rather than approximate versions of these states. This means that the entanglement entropy difference for the ground states of H 1 and H 2 will be identical to that of the states produced by C 1 and C 2 . Lemma 3. There exists a reduction QED O(1) ≤ P HQED O(1) that exactly preserves the entropy difference.
Proof. Assuming, as before, that the circuits acting on n+k qubits have the form C j = U d U d−1 ...U 1 , j ∈ {1, 2}, where each U i is a quantum gate and d is constant, we use the Hamiltonians considered in [BGM19] :
where |1 1| i acts non-trivially only on the i'th qubit. Since C j is a circuit of depth d, the locality of each term is 2 d . Because d is constant, the resulting Hamiltonian is local. As shown in [BGM19] , the unique ground state of H j is C j |00...0 . Thus, the entanglement entropy difference for H 1 and H 2 is given by the entanglement entropy difference of C 1 |00...0 and C 2 |00...0 , concluding the proof.
